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FESTO CHANGE-O? NO WAY! WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ATTACK ON THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Conrad J. DeWitte, Jr.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Purpose of Patents
Under Article I of the Constitution, the United States government has
the authority to grant patents. The government grants patents to
promote technological advancement and to encourage disclosure of
inventions, and it accomplishes these goals by offering an exclusive, legal
2right to each invention for a limited period of time.
Congress has delegated the constitutional authority to grant patents to
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which has
developed an orderly process for examining patent applications.3 A
patent examiner reviews each patent application, including the patent
claims, to ensure that it meets a number of formal and substantive
requirements. 4 To ensure compliance with the substantive requirements,
+ J.D. candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author thanks Christopher Philip Wrist for his generous comments and
encouragement.
1. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
3. "The United States Patent and Trademark Office is established as an agency of
the United States, within the Department of Commerce." 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2000). See
generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 8th ed., 2001) [hereinafter MPEP].
4. Petitioner's Brief at *4, *16, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025738 (citing Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) for the proposition that patentability involves the
subject matter provisions of the code only); see also Tr. of Oral Argument, Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2002 WL
22010, at 5 (U.S. Jan 8, 2002). Counsel for Festo Corporation argued that 35 U.S.C. §§
101-103 (the requirements that the invention be useful, novel, and non-obvious,
respectively) are substantive requirements because they describe the minimum content
that must be included in a patent application. Conversely, 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-112 (the
requirements for the application and specification, respectively) are merely formal
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the patent examiner reviews any prior art identified by the applicant.5
The examiner then conducts a prior art search to ensure that the
proposed patent claims are not anticipated by, or obvious in view of, that
which is known by those skilled in the art 6 ("the prior art").' The prior
art search is an important function of the USPTO and is paid for by the
applicant through the USPTO filing fee.8 Upon completion of the
examination, the USPTO determines whether to allow the patent
application to issue into a patent.9
B. Obtaining a Patent Prior to Festo
Prior to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
(Festo), 10 a patent attorney usually drafted the initial set of claims as
requirements because they relate to "the form of the application and not to the subject
matter sought to be patented." Id.
5. MPEP, supra note 3, § 609, at 600-116 ("There is no requirement that an
applicant for a patent make a patentability search."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2001) (stating that
an applicant is required to submit an "Information Disclosure Statement" listing any
information, of which he is aware, that may be material to patentability, as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2001)).
6. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 706.02, at 700-20 (stating that "[b]y far, the most
frequent ground of rejection is on the ground of unpatentability in view of the prior art,
that is, that the claimed subject matter is either not novel under 35 U.S.C. 102, or else it is
obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103"); see also John M. Benassi, Proving Patent Infringement
After Festo (Or If Festo Is Reversed), in G-669 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT
LITIGATION 2001, at 363, 364 (2001) (observing that "[t]he key inquiry of patent
infringement is whether the properly construed claim 'reads on' the accused device").
7. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2001) (stating that the examiner "shall make a thorough
investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject matter of the claimed
invention"). According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,
After the application has been read and the claimed invention understood, a
prior art search for the claimed invention is made. With the results of the prior
art search, including any references provided by the applicant, the patent
application should be reviewed and analyzed in conjunction with the state of the
prior art to determine whether the claims define a useful, novel, nonobvious, and
enabled [35 U.S.C. § 112, 1] invention that has been clearly described in the
specification. The goal of examination is to clearly articulate any rejection early
in the prosecution process so that the applicant has the opportunity to provide
evidence of patentability and otherwise reply completely at the earliest
opportunity. The examiner then reviews all the evidence, including arguments
and evidence responsive to any rejection, before issuing the next Office action.
MPEP, supra note 3, § 706, at 700-17.
& See National Application Filing Fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2001).
9. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 203.04, at 200-100.
10. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct.
1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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broadly as could be supported by the application disclosure." If the
patent examiner uncovered prior art that anticipated, or made obvious,
the invention recited in the originally broad claims, the patent attorney
narrowed the scope of the claims by amendment. 12  Given that most
patent application claims were amended because of prior art uncovered
by the patent examiner, 3 the Federal Circuit Court has traditionally been
circumspect when considering whether to limit the interpretations given
to amended claims.
4
C. Festo Changed the Rules
In 1988, Festo Corporation (Festo) brought an action against Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki and SMC Pneumatics (collectively SMC),
claiming that SMC's device infringed the claims of Festo's "Stoll
patent"'" and "Carroll patent,"" each of which relates to magnetically
11. See John A. Wasleff, Festo Opens the Door: Case Sharply Limits Doctrine of
Equivalents; Designing Around Patents Will Now Succeed More, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001,
at C1, C21 ("Before Festo, only the particular subject matter surrendered by the applicant
for the purpose of overcoming the prior art would be lost through estoppel.").
12. See id.; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Doctrine of Equivalents Receives Death Blow
in Federal Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 2000, at 5 (quoting Harold C. Wagner as stating that
"[flor generations, some patent attorneys drafted overly broad claims and whittled the
scope down to reach some compromise with the examiner. . . [but a]fter Festo, attorneys
must come in with realistic claims as filed and seek their allowances without
amendment"); Paul F. Fehlner, A New "Biohazard" for Patent Applicants: Broad
Biotechnology Patent Claims, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Mar., 2001, at 4 ("Patent applicants
walk a fine line between claiming their inventions broadly enough to block competitors,
and narrowly enough to meet the criteria for patentability. Traditionally, the tendency is
to err on the side of greater breadth.").
13. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 3, § 706.02, at 700-19 ("By far the most frequent
ground of rejection is on the ground of unpatentability in view of the prior art, that is, that
the claimed subject matter is either not novel under 35 U.S.C. 102, or else it is obvious
under 35 U.S.C. 103."). See also id. § 706.02(b), at 700-23 (observing that to overcome a §
102 rejection, the applicant may argue that the claims are patentably distinguishable from
the prior art or amend the claims to distinguish his invention from the prior art).
14. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("Amendment of claims is a common practice in prosecution of patent applications. No
reason or warrant exists for limiting application of the doctrine of equivalents to those
comparatively few claims allowed exactly as originally filed and never amended."), quoted
in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Festo, 234 F.3d at 618
(Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]his court's imposition of a complete
bar creates the perverse incentive for patent applicants ...to simply abandon their
applications. In many cases, it may be more effective to protect an invention by
maintaining it as a trade secret than by accepting a patent that will publicize the invention,
but provide protection only from literal infringement.").
15. U.S. Patent No. 4,354,125.
16. U.S. Patent No. 3,779,401.
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coupled rodless cylinders. 7 The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found that SMC had infringed the claims of
both of Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 8 The court
granted summary judgment with respect to the Carroll patent claims, and
a jury found infringement with respect to the Stoll patent claims.' 9 A
Federal Circuit Court panel affirmed the judgment on appeal.20 SMC
appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit Court for further consideration
in light of its intervening decision,2' Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co.22 On remand, the Federal Circuit Court affirmed the
district court's decision with respect to infringement of the Carroll patent
claims, and it vacated and remanded for further proceedings with respect
to the Stoll patent. 3 On petition by Festo, the Federal Circuit Court
17. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. 88CV1814, 1994 WL
1743984 (D. Mass Feb. 3, 1994), affd, 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted & vacated,
520 U.S. 1111 (1997), remanded to 117 F.3d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and remanded to 172
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted & vacated, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
on reh'g en banc, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated,
122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Peter
Corcoran, The Scope of Claim Amendments, Prosecution History Estoppel, and the
Doctrine of Equivalents After Festo VI, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 161-63 (2001)
(summarizing the prosecution history of Festo).
1& Festo, 1994 WL 173984, at *6. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a device or
process that does not literally infringe a patent may be found to infringe if it is
substantially similar to what is patented. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 18.04, at 18-242 (2001). See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
19. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 862 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. granted & vacated, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997), remanded to 117 F.3d 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1997), and remanded to 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted &
vacated, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), on reh'g en banc, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d
1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
20. Festo, 72 F.3d at 860. This panel was composed of Judges Rich, Newman,and
Michael. Id.
21. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111, 1111
(1997), remanded to 117 F.3d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and remanded to 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted & vacated, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), on reh'g en
banc, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct.
1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
22. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
23. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted & vacated, 187 F.3d 1.381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), on reh'g en
bane, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct.
1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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granted a rehearing en banc 4 and held that the doctrine of equivalents
does not apply to claim elements narrowed by amendment for any reason
related to patentability 5' The Federal Circuit Court then reversed the
judgment that SMC infringed the claims of the Stoll and Carroll patents
under the doctrine of equivalents. 26
D. Festo Should Be Reversed
This Comment first examines the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in
Festo and briefly reviews the law of claim infringement, both literal and
under the doctrine of equivalents, as it stands after the Supreme Court's
decision in Warner-Jenkinson. Next, this Comment explores the
apparent pre-Festo split in the Federal Circuit Court between the flexible
and strict approaches to the application of the doctrine of equivalents
and notes how Festo clarifies this split. This Comment then examines the
impact of Festo and considers whether Festo's complete bar on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents removes a significant barrier to
copyists and, therefore, is unfair to current patent holders who will be
affected retroactively by the decision. Finally, this Comment argues that
unless the Supreme Court clearly reaffirms the flexible approach to the
application of the doctrine of equivalents, this area of patent law will
remain uncertain until Congress decisively determines the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents.
II. PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION: DEFINING THE PROPERTY RIGHT
The creator or builder of an unpatented device "has certain common
law rights that accompany ownership of tangible personal property."27 A
patent confers the additional "right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented invention." ' If the patent owner believes
that his patent claims have been infringed, he can bring an action to
24. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), on reh'g en banc, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915
(2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
25. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563-64
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
26. Id. at 564.
27. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.1, at 3 (4th ed.
1998).
28. Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(emphasis removed).
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enjoin the infringer and seek compensation, including damages and
prejudgment interest on those damages.2 '
A. The Two-Step Patent Infringement Analysis: (1) What Did You Say?
(2) What Did You (Really) Say?
Patent infringement analysis is a two-step process." When a party
brings a complaint before a court, the court must first engage in "claim
construction," or claim interpretation, to determine exactly what the
words used in the claim mean in the context of the patent specification.3'
Second, the court must determine if the defendant's device or process
infringes a claim, as constructed, in the plaintiff's patent.2 The court may
find that the defendant's device or process infringes the claim literally or
that it infringes the claim under the judicially created doctrine of
equivalents.33  The court will find literal infringement when the
defendant's device is covered within the literal meaning of the claims as
constructed by the court:1 Alternatively, the court may find
29. HARMON, supra note 27, at 605-07. Before 1983, a successful plaintiff could
expect injunctive relief and a small amount of damages; after 1983, however, a plaintiff
could expect complete compensation. Id. In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461
U.S. 648 (1983), the Supreme Court held that "prejudgment interest on patent
infringement damages should be awarded absent some justification for denying such
relief." HARMON, supra note 27, at 605.
30. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31. Id. at 1566, 1576 (discussing the methods the court uses to determine what the
words in the claim mean); see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384-
91 (1996) (holding that patent claim interpretation is a matter of law and therefore "an
issue for the judge, not the jury"); see also Benassi, supra note 6, at 363. To obtain a
patent, the inventor must file a complete application, including a specification. 4 DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.01 (2001). "The specification must include (a) an
adequate disclosure of the invention and (b) claims." Id. § 11.02[l][a]. "The construction
of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse language of the claims, in order
to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims." HARMON, supra
note 27, § 5.6, at 203 (citing Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genetech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
32 See Minn. Mining & Mfg., 976 F.2d at 1570; see also HARMON, supra note 27, §
6.1, at 241.
33. See HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3, at 269-70; see also Benassi, supra note 6, at
364-68 (describing literal infringement analysis and infringement analysis using the
doctrine of equivalents).
34. See HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.2(a)(ii), at 251-52 (stating that when determining
literal infringement, "[t]he claims alone delimit the right to exclude; only they may be
infringed"); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that the "doctrine of equivalents comes into play only when actual literal
infringement is not present"). Literal infringement is rare. See infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents35 by finding that the
defendant's device, while not covered by the literal meaning of the claims
as constructed, still infringes a claim because it is substantially equivalent
to the patented device. 6 The plaintiff must prove infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents by a preponderance of the evidence.37
B. Prosecution History Estoppel: Proving What the Patent Holder Didn't
(Really) Say
One tool a defendant may use to rebut a charge of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents is the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel. 38 Prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of a claim
through review of the arguments and claim amendments made by the
applicant during prosecution to overcome rejections over the prior art.3'
Under prosecution history estoppel, claim amendments made and
arguments proffered to the USPTO during the application's prosecution
"may preclude a patentee from recapturing what was foregone during
prosecution of the patent application."' Thus, anything said during a
patent's prosecution will be used against a patent holder when he later
attempts to convince a court that his patent claims have been infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents.4'
35. Application of the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact. See Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 591-93 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (Plager, J., concurring) (arguing that a better solution to the question
posed in Festo would be to take its application out of the hands of the jury and make its
application a question of law).
36. HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3(a), at 270 ("The classical test for equivalence was
whether the accused device performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain substantially the same result.") (footnote omitted).
37. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1361.
38. Prosecution history is "[t]he complete record of proceedings in the Patent and
Trademark Office from the initial application to the issued patent." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1237 (7th ed. 1999). Patent "prosecution" refers to the activity necessary to
process a patent application in the USPTO. See id. Prosecution history estoppel "applies
to claim amendments to overcome rejections based on prior art, . . .and to arguments
submitted to obtain the patent." Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362 (citation omitted); see
also HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3(b), at 295 ("[P]rosecution history estoppel will not
allow the patentee to recapture through equivalence certain coverage given up during
prosecution.") (footnote omitted).
39. See Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362.
40. HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3(b), at 296.
41. See HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3(b), at 298.
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III. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS BEFORE
FESTO: How SHOULD THE COURTS PROTECT PATENT HOLDERS FROM
THE UNSCRUPULOUS COPYIST?
The doctrine of equivalents is justified in part because it prevents
potential copyists from avoiding infringement by making insubstantial
modifications to a patented device.42 Were courts to recognize only
literal infringement of a claim, a copyist could make an unimportant
change to a patented device to avoid a finding of infringement.43 Critics
of the doctrine of equivalents argue that the doctrine introduces
uncertainty into the interpretation of patents because it is impossible to
know when a device infringes a patent until litigation resolves a
complaint of infringement a  This uncertainty chills innovation and
discourages companies from engaging in incremental improvements by
creating the potential for patent claim infringement suits.45 The range of
equivalents to be granted to patent claims has been the subject of much
discourse, and the discussion that follows highlights the main points of
the debate, which provides a background for discussion of the Festo
opinion.4
A. Beyond Literal Infringement: The Patent Grant Should Preclude
Imperfect Copies
In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,47 the
Supreme Court recognized that to protect patent holders from the
"unscrupulous copyist," the method for interpreting patent claims must
42. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)
(arguing that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary).
43. Id.
44. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575,
577 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the uncertainty that has resulted
from the flexible approach).
45. See Id. at 577.
46. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 990 (1997). The distinction between improvement and
imitation is "critical to achiev[e] the proper balance of intellectual property rights." Id.
On one hand, allowing too much imitation "will stifle development and commercialization
of new products." Id. On the other hand, discouraging improvements too strongly will
"freeze development at the first generation of products." Compare Winans v. Denmead,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1854) (creating judge-made law to protect patent holders from
copyists who make trivial changes to inventions as described by the words of the patents),
with Festo, 234 F.3d at 574, 577 (limiting the doctrine of equivalents to encourage
incremental innovation).
47. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
[Vol. 51:1011330
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extend beyond literal claim infringement.4" Linde Aire Products, owner
of patents for an electric welding process and for fluxes to be used with
the process,49 sued Graver Tank and Manufacturing, claiming that its
fluxes were "identical in composition and produc[ed] the same kind and
quality of weld."5 The Court agreed that the two compositions were
"alike" even though there was a slight difference between the two
fluxes.51 The Court stated that because "[o]utright and forthright
duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement," the inquiry
should focus on whether the alleged infringing device is "equivalent" to
the patented device.52 The Court stated that the doctrine of equivalents
is based on the presumption that "if two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result,
they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape."53
Further, because a "finding of equivalence is a determination of fact," its
determination is to be made at the trial level.54 The Supreme Court did
not formulate a rigid test, stating instead that "[e]quivalence, in the
patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum."55  Trial courts should consider "whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one
that was."56 Thus, the Supreme Court instructed trial courts to consider
48. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
49. See id. at 606-07.
50. Id. at 610.
51. Id. (stating that the unpatented flux was like the patented flux except that it
substituted a non-alkaline earth metal (manganese) for the alkaline earth metal
(magnesium)).
52. Id. at 607-08 (noting the origins of the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853)). Over time, this requirement has been refined.
Compare Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc. 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(stating that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is sustained only "if the
presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device" is shown),
with Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating
that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is sustained when the accused device is
equivalent to the patented device as a whole).
53. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
54. See id. at 609; FED. R. Cv. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
55. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 609.
56. Id.
2002]
1332 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 51:101
patent claim infringement in the context of the infringement's
57
occurrence.
However, even at this early state in the formulation of the doctrine of
equivalents, there were concerns.5 ' In his dissent, Justice Black criticized
the majority, stating that the Court was looking to the specification "to
alter a claim free from ambiguous language., 59 Although Justice Black
supported the concept of the doctrine of equivalents, he argued that it
should apply only in situations "where differences between the claims of
the patent and the allegedly infringing product are de minimis, colorable
only, and without substance." '
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents as Applied by the Federal Circuit:
Thoroughness Versus Efficiency
When President Reagan signed the Federal Courts Improvement Act
in 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
created and was granted exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in the
hope of bringing uniformity to patent law application.61 Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit Court began to inconsistently apply the doctrine of
equivalents shortly after its creation. 6 In fact, two lines of authority
57. See id. at 611-12 (upholding a finding of infringement by the trial court based on
(1) identical operation and (2) equivalents in all respects for welding purposes). The
Court further stated that "[w]ithout some explanation or indication that [the infringing
item] ... was developed by independent research, the trial court could properly infer that
the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or invention." Id. at
612.
5& See id. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51
(1886)) (declaring that a patent claim cannot be treated "like a nose of wax which may be
turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make
it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express").
60. Id. at 616.
61. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. it, 14; see
Jonathan Ringel, 20 Years of Courting Patents, INTELL. PROP., Oct. 8, 2001, at 31, 32.
62. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 573 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to
304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, §
18.05[3][b], at 18-492 (1998), and referencing Douglas A. Strawbridge, et al., Area
Summary, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887-88 (1987), Gregory J. Smith, The Federal
Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 901, 921 (1989), and Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After
Warner-Jenkinson, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2330, 2336 (1998)); see Ringel, supra note 61, at 32
(stating that the Federal Circuit Court was created to decide patent cases more uniformly,
but that some argue that "the splits between regional circuits have merely been replaced
by disagreements between different panels of the Federal Circuit").
Festo Change-o? No Way!1
emerged, each defining the scope of estoppel based on: (1) whether the
patent claims were amended to exclude prior art, and (2) whether the
applicant proposed arguments to distinguish the patent claims from the
prior art.63
1. A Flexible Approach: Determining a Specific Patent's Scope Based
on the Facts Surrounding Its Prosecution
The flexible approach, championed in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States,64 provides that amendments to patent claims during the patent
prosecution process do not necessarily foreclose the possibility of patents
being infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 6 Under the flexible
approach "prosecution history estoppel 'may have a limiting effect' on
the doctrine of equivalents 'within a spectrum ranging from great to
small to zero."' ' Thus, even after amending a patent claim, a range of
equivalents determined by the purpose and scope of the amendment
remains open to the patent holder.67
2. A Strict Approach: A voiding Hypothetical Patent Prosecution
The strict approach used in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co." and Prodyne
Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc.,69 illustrates how the Federal
63. Festo, 234 F.3d at 573.
64. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 1361. Hughes claimed that the United States infringed, under the doctrine
of equivalents, its patents relating to velocity control and orientation of a spin-stabilized
satellite. See id. at 1352-61. The Federal Circuit Court stated that there was no reason to
limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents to unamended claims. Id. at 1363.
Instead, the "purpose of the amendment" would determine the degree to which the
amended claim would be limited. Id. at 1363. The court also noted that use of new
technology, such as computer technology, unavailable at the time of the patent would not
bar a finding of equivalence. Id. at 1365. Thus, the court instituted a case-by-case review
of patents to determine infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 1361.
66. Festo, 234 F.3d at 573 (quoting Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1363); see also
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[W]henever the
doctrine [of equivalents] is invoked, 'a close examination must be made as to, not only
what was surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender;' the fact that the claims
were narrowed 'does not always mean that the doctrine of file history estoppel completely
prohibits a patentee from recapturing some of what was originally claimed."') (quoting
Bayer Akiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
67. See Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1363; Wasleff, supra note 12.
68. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Kinzenbaw, the defendant, John Deere & Co.,
argued that the plaintiff, Kinzenbaw, had infringed under the doctrine of equivalents its
patents relating to a tractor-pulled farm implement called a row planter, which uses metal
disks supported by gauge wheels to cut furrows into the ground. Id. at 385, 389. The
plaintiff argued that the prosecution history of defendant's patent prevented the court
from finding infringement by equivalence because during prosecution of the patent, the
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Circuit Court reacts when the prosecution history of the allegedly
infringed patent precludes a determination of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.70 This approach is the court's response to a
particular argument that the court has only heard twice; in both cases,
the patent holders argued that their patents were infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents because the patent claims could have been written
in a way that avoided the prior art of record while making the allegedly
infringing device literally infringe the patent.7" Under this approach, a
court will not allow a patent holder to recapture surrendered subject
matter by arguing that during the examination of the patent application,
defendant narrowed a patent claim to avoid a patent examiner's rejection over prior art,
which disclosed a planter with adjustable gauge wheels mounted adjacent to the disks. See
id. at 388-89. The defendant argued that it narrowed the claims by specifying that the
radius of a gauge wheel was less than the radius of a disk, but that prosecution history
estoppel should not apply because the amendment was unnecessary to overcome the prior
art. Id. at 389. The court held that the plaintiff's device did not infringe and that the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel applied because this was not an "unanticipated
equivalent." Id. The court further stated that it would not engage in a "speculative
inquiry" regarding whether the patent examiner would have allowed a differently worded
amendment, which would have covered plaintiff's device. Id.
69. 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This case dealt with the defendant's infringement
of plaintiff's cheese slicer. Id. at 1582. Specifically, Prodyne's patent claimed a cheese
slicer with a wire that was wrapped around one end of a U-shaped bar and held in place at
the other end by a tensioning handle. Id. Pomerantz's allegedly infringing device included
a wire "attached through a transverse, centrally disposed slot in the first leg of the bar"
and "held in position by a knot in the end of the wire." Id. at 1583. The court held that
the plaintiff was barred from a finding of infringement by equivalence by the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel because the plaintiff had substituted "looped around" for
"attached" during patent prosecution, and such a substitution would lead a competitor to
reasonably believe that the subject matter had been disclaimed. Id. The plaintiff argued
that the amendment was not necessary to overcome the prior art, but the court refused to
"speculate" on the necessity of the amendment. See id.
70. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389; Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583. Arguably, the
strict approach is actually nothing more than application of the flexible approach to one
specific argument. Festo, 234 F.3d at 610 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); id. at 628 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Michel argued that
the two cases applied the flexible bar in Hughes Aircraft because "the panels did indeed
look to the exact scope of surrender," but "[tihey simply found that the surrender covered
the accused subject matter." Id. at 610. Compare Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362
(stating that Hughes was barred from arguing that the claim would have been allowed
even if its language was broader because those "elements of its claims [were] unnecessary
to avoid the art") (internal quotations omitted), with Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 (stating
that court would not speculate whether a more broadly worded claim would have been
allowed over the prior art), and Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583 (same).
71. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389; Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583; see Festo, 234 F.3d
at 610 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority failed
to "mention that the second 'line' consists of only two cases"); see also CHISUM, supra
note 62, § 18.05[3][b][i], at 18-496 ("Two 1984 Federal Circuit panel decisions articulated
the strict approach to estoppel.").
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the applicant (now patent holder) did not need to cede so much of the
originally claimed invention to overcome a patent examiner's rejection. 72
Thus, the effect of the strict approach is to keep a patent holder from
proposing post hoc hypothetical amendments to issued claims as a way to
allow application of the doctrine of equivalents when the patent's
prosecution history clearly precludes its application. 3
3. Strictly Flexible: A Reconciliation?
These two lines of authority can be reconciled by looking at the subject
matter discussed in the two patents.74 Hughes Aircraft concerned a
relatively new (electronic) technology75 whereas Kinzenbaw dealt
exclusively with an established (mechanical) technology. 76 Thus, the
differing treatment given to the doctrine of equivalents rested on how
many other patents covering similar technology existed at the time.
77
Hence, the two different approaches stemmed from the contexts in which
the cases arose and the relative difficulty involved in applying the
doctrine of equivalents, rather than the Federal Circuit Court's general
affinity or aversion to a particular approach. 8 The court's treatment of
72. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 573 (stating that under the strict approach the court refused
to speculate whether a narrower amendment would have been allowed).
73. See Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that the court would not
speculate whether a more broadly worded claim would have been allowed over the prior
art); Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583 (same).
74. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 610-11 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(arguing that Kinzenbaw and Prodyne were applications of the flexible approach that was
used in Hughes Aircraft).
75. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362. Hughes obtained a patent for a satellite that
transmits information to Earth to allow a ground crew to calculate its position. Id. at 1360.
NASA designed a satellite that performed the same calculation, but it performed part of
the calculation in a computer located on board the satellite. Id. at 1360-61. The court
decided that NASA's satellite infringed the Hughes patent under the doctrine of
equivalents, stating that Hughes was "not required to predict all future developments
which enable the practice of his invention in substantially the same way." Id. at 1362.
76. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 385 ("All five patents cover elements of a row planter, an
agricultural machine that, when pulled by a tractor, opens a furrow in the soil, places seeds
at appropriate intervals in the furrow, and loosely covers the seeds with moist earth.").
77. Compare Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362 (stating that that even though the
Hughes invention is "not of such 'pioneer' status as to entitle the invention to the very
broad range of equivalents to which pioneer inventions are normally entitled," the
invention is still entitled to some range of equivalents, possibly greater than the "very
narrow range of equivalents applicable to improvement patents in a crowed art"), with
Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 (stating that it was "inappropriate" to "enlarge the literal
scope of the patent claims," given that the invention was an improvement in a crowded
art).
78. See supra note 77.
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Hughes Aircraft in Kinzenbaw supports this interpretation." In addition,
in Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., a panel of the
Federal Circuit Court cited both cases, using Hughes Aircraft to define
prosecution history estoppel and Kinzenbaw to show that the court will
not edit poorly drafted claim amendments to create infringement when
none exists."'
Furthermore, it appears that the Federal Circuit Court applies the
strict approach in order to avoid engaging in a hypothetical re-
prosecution of the application of the patent at issue." Thus, the court
favors the strict approach over the flexible approach only when it seeks
to avoid determining whether one of the infinite number of amendments
that the plaintiff might have submitted to overcome an examiner's prior
art rejection would have in fact overcome the examiner's rejection and
caused the defendant's device to literally infringe the claim.8Q When the
court need not engage in hypothetical prosecution of a patent application
when applying the doctrine of equivalents, it will use the flexible
approach.83
C. Warner-Jenkinson: A Clarification, a Presumption, and a Command
The cases discussed above, if not themselves indicative of an
irreconcilable split, constitute the beginning of the end of a uniform
application of the doctrine of equivalents within the Federal Circuit
79. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 ("Such enlargement [of the literal scope of
the patent claim] would be particularly inappropriate here, where we deal with
'improvement patents in a crowed art."') (quoting Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362).
80. Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (stating that "prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent owner from obtaining
a claim construction that would resurrect subject matter surrendered during the
prosecution of his patent application"). More recently, the Federal Circuit Court made
pronouncements about the value of claim amendments in dicta, but the court denied any
equivalents, citing Kinzenbaw. See, e.g., Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993
F.2d 858, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Wang chose to limit its claims to a single row of
memory chips as opposed to a single module upon which all components are mounted and
that this limitation bars infringement of any memory chip configuration not in a single
row); see also 13 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 5413.10, at ABS-3419 to
ABS-3420 (2001).
81. Merck & Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 774 F.2d 483, 486 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(declining to speculate about whether a patent could be obtained without filing a terminal
disclaimer containing a common ownership provision); see also Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d 389;
Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583.
82. See Prodyne Enters., 743 F.2d at 1583 (citing Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362).
83. See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (finding non-infringement where a patent claim is interpreted without discussion of
patent prosecution history).
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Court.84 By 1996, significant disagreement within the Federal Circuit
concerning Graver Tank prompted the Supreme Court to clarify the
proper scope of the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson.8
1. A Four-Fold Clarification of the Doctrine of Equivalents
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court clarified four aspects of the
application of the doctrine of equivalents." First, the Court stated that
the alleged infringing device may contain only insubstantial differences
from that which is claimed in the patent."' Second, the Court embraced
the "all-elements rule," which states that the alleged infringing device
must contain all the elements of the patented device.8 Third, the Court
stated that a proposed equivalence might not cause a claim to fall within
the prior art." Finally, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel, stating that a patent holder is precluded from claiming
as an equivalent any art that was disclaimed during prosecution to avoid
prior art or to address an issue related to patentability.9°
84. See CHIsUM, supra note 62, § 18.05[3][b], at 18-492. For an early criticism of
Kinzenbaw, see Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating that Kinzenbaw illustrates that application of the doctrine of equivalents should
be performed on a case-by-case basis, "guided by equitable and public policy principles
underlying the doctrines involved and by the facts of the particular case").
85. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 516 U.S. 1145 (1996), rev'd & remanded 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) ("The significant
disagreement within the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concerning the
application of Graver Tank suggests... that the doctrine is not free from confusion. We
therefore will endeavor to clarify the proper scope of the doctrine.").
86. HARMON, supra note 27, § 6.3(b), at 299-300 (outlining the four limits imposed on
the doctrine of equivalents by Warner-Jenkinson).
87. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27-28, 39-40.
88. Id. at 29-30; Festo, 234 F.3d at 586 (recognizing the all-elements rule as one of the
two "primary legal limitations" on the doctrine of equivalents) (citing Warner-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 39 n.8).
89. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31 (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g
Corp., 294 U.S. 42,48 (1935)).
90. Id. at 30-33; Festo, 234 F.3d at 586 (recognizing prosecution history estoppel as
the other of the two "primary legal limitations" on the doctrine of equivalents) (citing
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8); see also, e.g., Southwall Technologies, Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 ("A patentee may not proffer an interpretation for
the purposes of litigation that would alter the indisputable public record consisting of the
claims, the specification and the prosecution history, and treat the claims as a 'nose of
wax."') (quoting Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 819 n.8
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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2. A Presumption That Amendments Are Related to Patentability
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court also created a rebuttable presumption
that when reviewing unexplained claim amendments, "the court should
presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment." 9'
However, the Court cautioned that where the change was not made to
avoid the prior art, but instead to introduce a new element, the doctrine
of equivalents may apply to the newly included element.92 Further, the
Court reiterated the "reasonably skilled practitioner standard" discussed
in Graver Tank,93 stating that just "as the perspective of the hypothetical
'reasonable person' gives content to concepts such as 'negligent'
behavior, the perspective of a skilled practitioner provides content to,
and limits on, the concept of 'equivalence.' 94
3. A Command To Determine Infringement Element by Element
The Supreme Court referred to two tests for determining equivalence
that had developed in Federal Circuit Court case law.95 However,
because the tests were inflexible, the Supreme Court focused on whether
the alleged infringing product or process contained elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.9
Additionally, the Court cautioned against enlarging the scope of a patent
claim by "go[ing] beyond the substitution of equivalent elements.""
Thus, the Court explained that courts should not look for overall
equivalence between the claims and an allegedly infringing device;
instead, they should look to see if individual elements are infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents.98
91. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
92. Id.
93. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37 (discussing the "reasonably skilled practitioner
standard" as developed in Graver Tank); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing present patent practice).
94. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36.
95. Id. at 39 (explaining the "insubstantial differences test" and the "triple identity
test" for determining equivalence, which focus on the function an element serves, the way
it is executed, and the result obtained). For other tests, see CHISUM, supra note 80,
5413.10, at ABS-3421.
96. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40; see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
97. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573-1574 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting)).
9& See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
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IV. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AFTER
FESTO: SHOULD WE PROTECT PATENT HOLDERS FROM THE
UNSCRUPULOUS COPYIST AT ALL?
According to the majority in Festo, the flexible approach of Hughes
Aircraft failed to produce consistent results that could be predicted by
the marketplace. 99 The Federal Circuit Court also stated that the flexible
approach failed to properly narrow an amended claim when applying
prosecution history estoppel, to preserve the patent's notice function,
and to promote patent law.1'0
A. Festo Creates a Retroactive Bright-Line Rule Limiting a Finding of
Infringement by Equivalents to Patent Claims That Were Not Amended
During Prosecution
Because of the perceived "unworkability" of its flexible approach to
the doctrine of equivalents 1 and fears that an overbroad doctrine of
equivalents may discourage technological improvements by making the
outer bounds of a patent's reach uncertain,'" the Festo majority
abandoned the flexible approach and created a bright-line rule.03 The
rule stated that any amendment to a patent claim will result in a
"complete bar" to a finding of equivalents in an infringement claim."
This complete bar extends the Federal Circuit Court's strict approach to
the doctrine of equivalents because the adopted position refuses to
99. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102 See Lemley, supra note 46, at 990-91, 1003-05 (describing the expanded protection
from infringement that the doctrine of equivalents affords and stating that a balance must
be struck in patent rights because "[a]llow[ing] too much imitation ... will stifle the
incentives for development and commercialization of new products"); see also Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 839, 887, 908-09 (1990) (arguing that "broad patents do have a significant impact on
the development of a technology and hence on industry structure" and citing "the broad
Edison patent [which] slowed down progress in the incandescent lighting field" as the
"best example" of a company with an inside track that failed to move aggressively in light
of its patent protection).
103, Festo, 234 F.3d at 574.
104. Id. (holding that "prosecution history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the
application of the doctrine of equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope of
a claim for a reason related to patentability").
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"speculate" on whether a narrower amendment might have been
allowed, and it refuses to inquire about what the amendment disclaims.1a
B. Festo Limits the Enforceability of Patents Already Prosecuted
In her concurrence in Warner-Jenkinson, Justice Ginsburg specifically
warned that the Court's new rebuttable presumption places the burden
on a patent holder to establish that amendments made during
prosecution are not related to patentability."" Borrowing language from
Hughes Aircraft, Justice Ginsburg cautioned that "if applied woodenly,"
the decision might unfairly limit what some existing patents now cover.107
At the time their patents were prosecuted, patentees had no notice that
Warner-Jenkinson would create a presumption that unexplained
amendments are made for patentability reasons; thus, patentees had no
reason to memorialize explanations for all claim amendments in the
prosecution history.l" As a result, patentees in that situation "would
have had little incentive to insist that the reasons for all modifications be
memorialized in the file wrapper as they were made."' ' The Federal
Circuit Court's ruling, however, does not consider current patent holders'
reliance on the well-established legal doctrine of equivalents, which
creates a concern that patents prosecuted before the large penalty for
claim amendments are worthless."0
V. WHAT A SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATION OF FEsTO MEANS
A. Unless Reversed, Festo Applies Retroactively
Because there is no provision to grandfather patents prosecuted before
Festo, amendments made during the prosecution of these patents will
105. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Contra
Warner-Jenkinson Co, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (citing
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573-1574 (1995) (Nies,
J., dissenting)). See also discussion of strict bar approach, supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text.




110. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 620
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); id. at 613-15 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See generally Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717
F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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receive the same treatment as amendments made to patents prosecuted
after the Federal Circuit Court's new interpretation of the doctrine of
equivalents.11" ' Thus, the bright-line rule is unfair to patent holders who
prosecuted their applications relying on the previous and longstanding
application of the doctrine of equivalents.'1 2 However, there are some
limited legal options to compensate for this injustice."'
The Supreme Court has made clear that a rule interpreting federal law
must be applied retroactively for the sake of uniformity. 114 In Harper v.
Virginia Department of Taxation,"15 the Court held that a decision has full
retroactive effect whenever it is applied to the parties before the Court.
16
Harper reserved the previous test for retroactivity, articulated in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,117 for the unlikely case in which the Supreme
Court suggests a new rule in dicta.11 Given the majority's tone in
Harper, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will create a new rule in
dicta that lower courts will have discretion to apply."9 If the Supreme
111. Festo, 234 F.3d at 618-19 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But
see Lawrence B. Ebert, Heads Up On "Festo" Changes, NAT'L L.J. Feb. 5, 2001, at A21
(Col. 4) ("If Festo remains the law, there will be injustices to patent holders. But this is
because courts apply the law at the time of their decision, not because of deficiencies in
Festo per se.") (internal citation omitted).
112. See supra text accompanying note 109.
113. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,97 (1993).
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
116. Id. at 98 (recognizing that there is a legal "imperative to apply a rule of federal
law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so") (internal
quotation omitted).
117. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). In Chevron Oil, the Court
articulated a three-part test to determine if a new precedent should be applied
retroactively. Id. at 106. First, the decision "must establish a new principle of law, either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. (citation
omitted). Second, the court must "look[] to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation." Id. at 107. Finally, the court must weigh the "inequity imposed by retroactive
application" to make sure that retroactive application of the rule does not "produce [a]
substantial inequitable result[]." Id.
118. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (stating that "[w]hen [the Supreme Court] applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the
rule"); see id. (stating that this new rule will control in all cases where the court does not
"reserve whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it") (quoting James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 539 (1991)).
119. Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (citing "two basic norms of constitutional adjudication,"
the Court based its holding that all criminal precedent must be applied retroactively when
(1) the decision about whether to make a rule of law retroactive is a "quintessentially
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Court affirms Festo and retroactively applies a complete bar to the
parties before it, the decision will have full retroactive effect in all other
cases. 2 Such a decision will force courts to apply the complete bar in all
future cases involving patents prosecuted before Festo.1
21
B. Unless Reversed, Festo Will Create Obstacles for Individuals and Small
Businesses That Compete With Large Corporations
The majority in Festo was concerned, in part, because the flexible
approach creates a "zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims ....
[This barrier] discourag[es] invention only a little less than unequivocal
foreclosure of the field."'22 Under the flexible approach, there was a
perceived risk that an innovator may be found to infringe a patent claim
because of the low burden on a plaintiff to prove that there are
"insubstantial differences" between the patented device and the alleged
infringing device.' 23
legislative" act; and (2) "selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating
similarly situated [parties] the same") (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323
(1987)).
120. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 105 (stating that "[p]rospective decision making is the
handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis"); Cameron S. DeLong,
Note, Confusion in Federal Courts: Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive-
Prospective Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 117,128-36.
121. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 618-19
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
122. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (quoting Union
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)) quoted in Festo, 234 F.3d at
577; see Patently Absurd?, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2001, at 40 (describing the "tragedy
of the Anti-Commons" encountered in the computing, semiconductor, and information-
technology sectors of the economy). "Firms now encounter a 'thicket' of patents that
constrain their inventiveness.... [W]hen lots of property owners have to grant permission
before a resource can be used, the result is that the resource tends to be chronically under-
used. In the case of patents ... innovation is stifled." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(stating that infringement by equivalents must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence); Festo, 234 F.3d at 591 (Plager, J., concurring) (stating that under the flexible
bar, a patent holder only needs to show that "the claimed invention and the accused
product have only 'insubstantial differences') (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516-15.18 (Fed. Cir. 1995) cert. granted 516 U.S. 11.45 (1996),
rev'd & remanded 520 U.S. 17 (1997)); Festo, 234 F.3d at 591 (Plager, J., concurring)
(calling the insubstantial differences test a "wonderfully indeterminate phrase, lending
itself to making every decision under the doctrine an individualistic choice, if not a flip of
the coin"). Cf Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
(stating that to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, the patent holder must show
that the alleged infringing device contains each element claimed in the patented device).
Festo Change-o? No Way!
Even though fewer opportunities exist for patent holders to prove
infringement under the Festo complete bar, Festo does not change
Federal Circuit Court precedent regarding the general application of the
doctrine of equivalents to unamended claims. 24 Therefore, the problem
of unpredictability in the application of the doctrine of equivalents
remains. However, this unpredictability is now limited to claims that
were not amended during prosecution of the patent application. 15 In
response, patent attorneys and pro se applicants may be forced to draft
narrower claims that do not require amendment and to later rely on the
doctrine of equivalents to obtain the broadest possible scope for these
claims.126 In addition, Festo will probably lead more inventors to appeal
marginal rejections based on the obviousness of broadly drafted claims,
even though there will be additional costs."'
Festo also allows a copyist either to make insubstantial changes to the
patent to avoid infringement2 or to substitute after-invented technology
to circumvent a patent.129 In short, Festo changes when the doctrine of
equivalents can be applied, not how the doctrine of equivalents is
applied. 3 This reduces the value of any patent with an amended claim
124. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 577-78 (creating a complete bar to a finding of equivalents
for claims amended for any reason related to patentability and for unexplained claim
amendments); see also Turbocare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1.125-26 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a claim amendment was
not a narrowing amendment under the doctrine of equivalents). Cf Festo, 234 F.3d at 577-
78 (stating that the additional protection afforded by the flexible bar does not outweigh
the cost of uncertainty to the public).
125. Festo, 234 F.3d at 577 (praising the virtues of the complete bar in support of the
majority decision to limit the doctrine of equivalents to unamended claims).
126. Id. at 592-93 (Plager, J., concurring).
127. See id.
128. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n at *8, Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543) available
at 2002 WL 1025096 (agreeing with Judge Rader and Judge Linn that Festo will encourage
insubstantial design arounds); Festo, 234 F.3d at 630 (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that limiting patent claims to their literal meaning creates an
economic disincentive for innovation, encouraging only unimportant innovation).
129. Festo, 234 F.3d at 619-20 (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Rader stated that terms of art evolve over time. Id. at 619. Without the doctrine of
equivalents, a copyist could literally circumvent a patent claim describing an invention in
the terms of art of the day circumvented simply by describing an allegedly infringing
device using after-invented technology and terminology. See id. (giving the example that
the "outdated" terms "cathode" and "anode," which describe vacuum tube technology,
would not literally be considered "collectors" and "emitters," which describe transistor
technology, even though vacuum tubes and transistors perform the same function).
130. Id. at 574 ("We hold that prosecution history estoppel acts as a complete bar to
the application of the doctrine of equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope
of a claim for a reason related to patentability."); id. at 591 (holding that, in this case,
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without addressing the Federal Circuit Court's goal of changing how the
doctrine of equivalents should be applied.'3'
In the post-Festo world, large businesses have a marked advantage.
After a small company patents an innovation, a large business can review
the prosecution history for amendments to the patent claims, design
around the patent by making insubstantial changes to at least one
amended claim element, and then bring the product to market through
its established distribution channels and brand names.'32 Additionally,
the added costs that Festo imposes could limit the public's access to the
prosecution history estoppel precluded any range of equivalents). Festo barred
application of the doctrine of equivalents to amended claims, not unamended claims. Id.
at 563-64. Specifically, Festo considered amended claims in the first four questions
presented in the opinion, interpreting the Warner-Jenkinson all-elements rule in the fifth
question, and failed to consider the flexible bar approach as applied to unamended claims.
Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit Court provided no guidance on how to apply the doctrine of
equivalents in cases where the claim has not been amended. See id. at 569 (stating that a
complete bar rule exists "when a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel
with regard to the claim element"); id. at 600 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (calling the majority rule a "bar by amendment"); see also Patrick J. Flinn, Wither
Festo?, G-669 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 2001, at 323, 337 (2001)
(stating that "once a narrowing amendment related to patentability is made, no
equivalents at all are allowed").
131. Festo, 234 F.3d at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see supra
note 14.
132 See Patrick Neighly, Weighted Scales of Justice? Two Recent IP Laws Favor the
Big Guy, AM.'s NETWORK, Feb. 1, 2001, at 22 ("Larger companies wind up with valuable
lead time to design around patent applications, dedicating their larger budgets and staff to
beat the startup to market and gain roughly the same IP without the pesky business of
acquisition . . . . The small guy is really being handicapped here.") (internal quotation
omitted). Festo may also have severe repercussions on the biotechnology industry. Festo,
234 F.3d at 617 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that
"[c]ompletely barring resort to the doctrine of equivalents for amended claim limitations
may drastically limit the scope of protection for biotechnology patents, such as those
claiming a protein molecule"); see Brief of Amicus Curiae Celltech Group PLC. at *2,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. '1831 (2002) (No. 00-
1543), available at 2002 WL 1025107 (providing an example of how "a licensee who
entered into a pre-Festo license can use the Festo complete bar to avoid paying very
substantial royalties"). Additionally, small technology companies may discover that large
manufacturers will design around patents rather than agree to license a patented
technology (as is common practice). See also Patently Absurd?, supra note 122 (noting
that the computer, electronic, semiconductor and information-technology sectors depend
on "complex" technologies).
[I]n industries that use complex technology, the value of any particular patent
depends critically on the ability to use related technologies. Since it is rare that
any one company will hold all the patents involved, rival firms in complex
industries depend on each other to get innovations to the market.
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patent system.133  The new bright-line rule "increases the cost and
complexity of patent prosecution to the detriment of individual
inventors, start-up companies, and others unable to bear these increased
costs.' 34 The increased amount of work necessary to bring a patent to
the USPTO,135 as well as the likelihood of an increased number of
rejection appeals1 6 will increase the cost of effectively prosecuting a
patent.37 The increased cost gives an advantage to large companies and
individuals with ready capital at their disposal.38
C. Unless Reversed, Festo Will Make USPTO Services Redundant and
Will Create an Adversarial Patent Application Process
Festo will change the way patents are prosecuted by making USPTO
services redundant.1 39  This decision undermines the purpose of the
133. Margaret Quan, Patent Pangs, ELEC. ENG'G TIMES, Feb. 12, 2001, at 1, 22
(asserting that Festo "would make patent filing potentially more difficult and expensive--
or possibly even prohibitive for small companies and individuals"); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n at *17, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2002 WL 1025096; see
also Nathan Vardi, Me-Too Patents, FORBES, Apr. 16, 2001, at 58 ("The Festo case, which
appears headed toward the Supreme Court, is pitting large companies like IBM and
Ford-who say the fuzzy equivalency doctrine encourages lawsuits-against smaller firms
who worry their innovations will be ripped off.").
134. Festo, 234 F.3d at 620, 624 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[Tjhe
majority's new rule will substantially increase the cost of obtaining patent protection, and
may in fact become prohibitively high for individual inventors and start-up companies. It
will require applicants to undertake exhaustive pre-filing searches, which will not only be
costly but also time consuming."); Stephan Herrera, Festo Case Rewrites the Rules for
Biotech, RED HERRING, June 6, 2001, at 34. ("It also will surely raise the cost of securing
and protecting a patent, prompting some to conclude that the only true beneficiaries of
Festo are lawyers.").
135. See Quan, supra note 133, at 1 (stating that the increased amount of time that
attorneys will need to draft an application will "make patent filing potentially more
difficult and expensive-or possibly even prohibitive for small companies and
individuals").
136. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
137. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(b) (2001) (setting the fee for filing a notice of appeal from the
examiner to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences by a small entity at $155.00).
138. In its brief, Petitioner argues that:
The drastic negative consequences attached to amendments will drive patent
attorneys to (1) appeal all rejections rather than amend and accept an all-
encompassing estoppel; (2) file very narrow claims to avoid the need to amend,
and rely upon the doctrine of equivalents to capture subject matter not claimed;
or (3) abandon the patent system altogether and rely on trade secret law.
Petitioner's Brief, at *17, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S.
Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2002 WL 1025738.
139. See Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Prosecution of Patents in Light of
the Federal Circuit 'Festo' Decision, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24,2001, at 3.
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patent office's prior art search by changing the role of the patent office
from service provider to adversary.' °  After Festo, valid substantive
rejections from the patent office will not help to strengthen the patent by
honing the claim language to carve out the maximum scope of protection
to which the applicant is entitled.' 41 Instead, these rejections will serve to
constrict the scope of the allowed claims to their literal meaning.
142
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a patent application
"constitute[s] one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with
accuracy.''143 Festo complicates the patent process by forcing applicants
to "attempt to foresee every possible variation of the invention the
patent covers, starting out with a broad claim and following it with
successively narrower claims that cover every new twist," so that these
narrow claims might pass muster even if the broad claims are rejected.' 44
Thus, applicants must cover the full spectrum of broad to narrow claims
in the hope that the patent examiner will allow at least one claim in light
of the prior art without amendment and thereby preserve the possibility
that the claim may be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
45
Executing this strategy results in increased attorney and USPTO fees and
increases the number of claims in a patent without necessarily increasing
the quality of disclosure.' 46 Because a primary purpose of the patent
140. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 704.01, at 700-06 (stating that a patent applicant is not
required to conduct a prior art search before submitting an application to the USPTO, but
that such a search is part of the final examination process).
141. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 592 (Plager, J., concurring) (stating that the Festo court
"attempts to limit some of the indeterminacy of the doctrine of equivalents with a set of
bright line rules, trading off areas of uncertainty for a degree of rigidity"). Cf Autogiro
Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("In its broader use as source
material, the prior art cited in the file wrapper gives clues as to what the claims do not
cover."). Even if it were possible to have every possibly relevant or tangentially relevant
patent cited in the file wrapper, it would only provide a "clue" about what the claims
cover. See id.
142. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 592 (Plager, J., concurring).
143. Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (citing Topliff v.
Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892)).
144. Quan, supra note 133.
145. See id.
146. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 618 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(stating that Festo gives companies a financial incentive to maintain their inventions as a
trade secret rather than attempt to secure a patent). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the relationship between the patent prosecutor and the USPTO must
be protected to allow for frank discussions about the invention to be patented. Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Patent Office, not having testing facilities of its own, must rely upon
information furnished by applicants and their attorneys . . . . [A]pplicants,
[stand] before the Patent Office in a confidential relationship and [are] owed the
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system is complete public disclosure of inventions, this strategy is
inconsistent with the patent law framework. 47 Additionally, the Festo
complete bar will effectively require patent attorneys to conduct an
exhaustive and costly prior art search before submitting the application
to the USPTO.' 48
Prior to Festo, a patent examiner's rejection of a patent application for
failure to observe a statutory requirement was welcomed as a helpful
critique that would ultimately strengthen the patent.149 Today, post-filing
claim amendments made because of statutory requirements unrelated to
overcoming prior art will trigger the Festo complete bar.io Thus,
applicants will be held to an unnecessary standard of perfection when
fulfilling all administrative statutory requirements related to patentability
at the moment of filing. 5' Festo shifts the patent examiner's role from
last stage of review for any inadvertent statutory errors to the first line of
attack on the patent by creating estoppel where an applicant fails to
follow statutory requirements perfectly. 52 Any existing leeway between
obligation of frank and truthful disclosure .... [A]bsolute honesty and good
faith disclosure is necessary in the filing of a patent application.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). But see Robert J. Artuz & Edwin H.
Taylor, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent Application That Will Stand Up in Litigation,
in G-669 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 2001, at 973, 991-99 (2001)
(describing strategies for writing successful post-Festo patents, including providing a clear
definition of terms).
147. Festo, 234 F.3d at 618 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating
that Festo will deprive the public of "useful teachings"); id. at 624 (Linn, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). In addition to the original application filing fee, a small entity
must pay $40 for each independent claim in excess of three and $9 for each claim in excess
of twenty. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(b)-(c) (2001).
148. See Quan, supra note 133, at 22 (speculating that patent attorneys will have to
spend more time "researching the patents thoroughly to cover all the bases upfront");
Benassi, supra note 6, at 395-96 (stating that a thorough pre-filing prior art search will be
helpful in avoiding the limiting effects of Festo); see also Stephen E. Belisle, Patent
Infringement and Right-to-Use Opinions, in G-667 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
PREPARING PATENT LEGAL OPINIONS 95 (2001) (detailing what the patent prosecutor
must keep in mind when preparing patentability opinions for clients after Festo).
149. See, e.g., Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(determining, in part, whether the application met the written description requirement set
out in 35 U.S.C. § 112); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that a patent did not violate the best mode requirement under 35 U.S.C. §
112 and is therefore valid).
150. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563.
151. Id. at 563-64 (holding that amendments made for "other reasons related to the
statutory requirements for a patent," but not made to overcome prior art, will trigger the
Festo complete bar).
152. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 592 (Plager, J., concurring) (noting that "the court attempts
to limit some of the indeterminacy of the doctrine [of equivalents] with a set of bright-line
rules, trading off areas of uncertainty for a degree of rigidity").
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patent attorneys or pro se applicants and patent examiners will disappear
because amendments made in response to a rejection based on
administrative statutory requirements will severely limit the scope of the
final patent.
53
D. Unless Reversed, Festo Will Redirect, but Not Reduce, Litigation
In light of Festo, patent attorneys will advise their clients that patents,
which could once be construed very broadly under the doctrine of
equivalents, are now limited to their literal meaning because of
narrowing amendments made during prosecution.'- 4 Thus, Festo will
speed up many patent claim infringement suits and may initially decrease
their total number.155 However, as the number of claim infringement
suits decreases, ' 6 there will be a likely increase in appeals from
rejections during patent prosecution.5 1 The Festo complete bar
encourages applicants to file more claims of varying scope in an attempt
to ensure that at least one claim is allowed without amendment.
1 58
However, in situations where inundating the examiner with claims is
153. Quan, supra note 133, at 22 ("[U]nder Festo, companies and the attorneys who
write patents for them would not be able to make changes once the patent application is
filed" without triggering the complete bar.).
154. Festo, 234 F.3d at 569 (holding that "[w]hen a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range of
equivalents available for the amended claim element").
155. See id. at 598 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (observing that
"because most patents contain claims that were amended during prosecution, the
majority's holding effectively strips most patentees of their rights to assert infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents").
156. Festo does not eliminate the doctrine of equivalents; it simply adds the
preliminary question of whether a claim amendment is a narrowing amendment to any
claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Turbocare Div. of
Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1125-26 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (holding that cancellation of a claim containing the term "small diameter
position" and substitution of a new independent claim containing the term "'contact'
between certain surfaces" in response to a rejection was not a narrowing amendment
because the specification gave "small diameter position" the meaning "contact" and
remanding for further consideration of plaintiff-appellant's claim under the doctrine of
equivalents).
157. "When a patent applicant is faced with a rejection, or expects a rejection, he (or
she) is master of his claims. He can stand his ground and appeal, or amend the claims."
Festo, 234 F.3d at 597 (Lourie, J., concurring). During the Supreme Court oral argument,
attorney for Respondents (SMC) responded to a question by observing that the USPTO
has not seen an increase in appeals. Tr. of Oral Argument, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2002 WL 22010, at 36
(U.S. Jan 8, 2002). The Justice responded that perhaps "everybody is waiting for this
case." Id. at 36, lines 21-22.
158. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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ineffective, the applicant will be forced to engage in a time-consuming
and expensive appeals process59 to preserve the breadth of the claims in
his patent application.6 ° These appeals will present a new burden to the
patent office, "compounding an already immense backlog at the
[US]PTO Board of Appeals."'' Eventually, the Federal Circuit Court
will also feel the increased caseload as more USPTO Board of Appeals
decisions are challenged.'
E. Unless Reversed, Festo Will Encourage Trade Secrets Over Patents
The Federal Circuit Court only addressed the unworkability and
unpredictability of the doctrine of equivalents as applied to the
interpretation of amended claims, even though such complaints are also
valid when the doctrine of equivalents is used to interpret unamended
claims.' 63 The present mood of the Federal Circuit Court, evidenced by
Festo, suggests that the court may further extend the so-called strict
approach in the future by fundamentally limiting the doctrine of
equivalents as applied to unamended claims.' 6 Given the increased
159. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-1.198 (2001) (detailing the appeals process).
160. Cliston Brown, Festo Decision Narrows Doctrine of Equivalents, CORPORATE
LEGAL TIMES, Mar., 2001, at 70. According to Charles R. Hoffmann, a partner with
Hoffmann & Baron who represents Festo, "[tihe result [of Festo] will be a situation where
a patent applicant cannot afford to give up any language." Id. With the change in patent
law in 1995, the patent term is measured to be twenty years from the date of filing. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Therefore, there is an incentive to process an application
swiftly. See id. After weighing the options, however, an attorney may conclude that a
patent with a ten-year term and unamended patent claims that could make full use of the
doctrine of equivalents would be much more valuable than an amended patent with a
nineteen-year term. See Lawrence B. Ebert, Heads Up On "Festo" Changes, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 5, 2001, at A21; see also Benassi, supra note 6, at 401-06 (describing the time-
consuming methods of overcoming a patent examiner's rejections without losing
equivalents under Festo).
161. Slind-Flor, supra note 12 (quoting Professor Janice M. Mueller of John Marshall
Law School).
162. 37 C.F.R. § 1.301 (2001) ("Any applicant . . . involved in any ex parte
reexamination proceeding ... and dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ... may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.").
163. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 592 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to
304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Plager, J., concurring) (stating that the "net effect" of the
application of the doctrine of equivalents is that it is not settled until the Federal Circuit
Court makes a determination).
164. The majority of members of the Federal Circuit Court in Festo were clear that
they disliked the doctrine, which indicates that the court will place more restraints on the
application of the doctrine in the future. See, e.g., id. at 593 (Plager, J., concurring)
(calling the decision in Festo a "second-best solution" to treating equivalents as a matter of
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costs, 65 longer prosecution time,'66 and general uncertainty about the
state of the law surrounding the doctrine of equivalents, some companies
may decide to protect their intellectual property by maintaining it as a
trade secret rather than as a patented invention.' 67 Thus, Festo "foster[s]
law, not of fact); id. at 597 (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that the decision brings the
court's "standard of judicial review of findings of fact made by the PTO into line with the
standard of review applied to other agency decisions"); see also Steven Andersen, Federal
Circuit Gets Passing Marks to Date but There's a Lot of Room for Improvement. A Report
Card, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2000, at 86. According to Frank Porcelli,
chairman of the appellate practice group at Fish & Richardson in Boston and a patent law
professor at Harvard:
The non-patent judges on the Court seem to look to the judges with patent
backgrounds, such as Lourie or Newman, on particularly complex, technical
patent law issues. But you also see a lot of experimentation by these non-patent
judges when they see areas in which patent law doesn't make sense from their
perspective or it seems to be at odds with analogous non-patent law.
Id. Festo all but requires an extensive pre-filing prior art search to help applicants draft
applications that will not need to be amended. Benassi, supra note 6, at 395-96. In
addition, the duty to disclose information material to patentability is satisfied by the
submission of an information disclosure statement, which requires an attorney to disclose
the results of a private prior art search made before an application is submitted to the
USPTO. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56(a), 1.97,1.98 (2001). One could argue that patents disclosed on
an Information Disclosure Statement provide evidence of the applicant's attempt to
overcome prior art because if the applicant did not know about the prior art, he would
have drafted claims that included it. See, e.g., Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
261 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the applicant replaced claims that had
been rejected for obviousness with narrower claims); Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 190
F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (same); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d
887, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1.998) (same). It is possible that a Federal Circuit Court hostile to the
doctrine of equivalents might decide that disclosing patents in an information disclosure
statement constitutes an attempt to avoid prior art, and following Festo, any claims
accompanied by an information disclosure statement should not be granted any
equivalents under the Festo complete bar. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 566 (holding that no
equivalents will be granted when an amendment was made for a reason related to
patentability, including avoiding prior art).
165. See supra note 164.
166. See supra note 164.
167. Festo, 234 F.3d at 618 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating
that Festo gives companies a financial incentive to maintain their inventions as trade
secrets rather than attempt to secure a patent); see Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868
F.2d 1226, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that, barring a confidential relationship that
prohibited use of a trade secret, discovery of a trade secret by reverse engineering is
acceptable). Trade secrets include
information, such as the design for new piece[s] of machinery or the chemical
formula for a new ingredient in a product. It could also be research materials,
computer code, blueprints or other items. The only requirements are these: the
owner has taken "reasonable" measures to keep the information or materials
secret; and the material or information draws value from not being widely
known.
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concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the
primary purposes of the patent system."1t6
F Unless Reversed, Festo Will Create an Irrebutable Presumption That
Unexplained Claim Amendments Are Related to Patentability
For unexplained patent amendments, Festo places two burdens on
patent holders: 1) proving that an amendment is, in fact, explained in the
prosecution history, 69 and 2) proving that the amendment is not related
to patentability."' The requirement that a patent holder only use
evidence in the patent prosecution history to prove the reason for the
amendment'71 creates a Kafkaesque172 situation in which a patent holder
facing court inquiry cannot possibly rebut the presumption that there is a
non-patentability reason for the unexplained amendment.73 Because the
prosecution history of a pre-Festo patent application was created only to
illustrate the reasons for patentability, and not to document the reason
for every amendment regardless of its formal or substantive character,
John Mangels, Economic Espionage Losses in the Billions, Experts Say, THE PLAIN
DEALER, July 30, 2001, at A7, available at 2002 WL 20542223; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-76 (1974) (discussing the "widely relied-upon definition of
a trade secret found at Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b (1939)").
168. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (discussing
the proper method for interpreting patent claims and justifying the doctrine of equivalents
as a way to protect patent holders' rights).
169. Festo, 234 F.3d at 578 (stating that unexplained amendments would not be
granted any equivalents).
170. Id. at 565 (stating that the patent holder had the burden to prove that an
amendment was made for some reason other than patentability).
171. See id. at 586 (stating that the public notice considerations discussed in Warner-
Jenkinson require that any inquiry into the intent of an amendment must be based solely
on the prosecution history of the patent).
172. The Federal Circuit Court appears to give infringement protection for
unexplained amendments under the doctrine of equivalents, but, in fact, there is no
substance to this grant. Compare id. at 586 ("In order to give due deference to public
notice considerations under the Warner-Jenkinson framework, a patent holder seeking to
establish the reason for an amendment must base his arguments solely upon the public
record of the patent's prosecution."), with id. at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("[T]he majority holds that the rebuttable presumption concerning the
reason for an amendment, which presumption arises when the prosecution record is silent
as to the reason for the amendment, cannot be rebutted with evidence outside the
prosecution record. The rebuttable presumption thereby becomes irrebuttable, because
the prosecution record is necessarily silent in order for the presumption to arise at all.").
See also FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 213-18 (E.M. Butler ed., Willa & Edwin Muir trans.,
Schocken Books 1974) (1937) (describing one man's journey through a secretive and
formalistic legal maze where each man has a door by which to enter the law, but a
gatekeeper prevents his entrance until an undisclosed, appointed time).
173. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the only evidence available to a pre-Festo patent holder to prove his case
is extrinsic evidence.174 Thus, Festo creates an irrebutable presumption,
which guarantees that pre-Festo patent holders with unexplained claim
amendments will lose.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE FESTO OR CONGRESS
SHOULD ACT
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court warned against a new bright-
line rule that would adversely affect pre-Festo patents and cautioned
against judicial activism.'75 By eviscerating the doctrine of equivalents in
Festo, the Federal Circuit Court has overstepped its bounds by
unnecessarily changing the long-standing rules governing the application
of the doctrine of equivalents on which applicants reasonably expected to
rely once their applications issued into patents.176 However, until theSupreme Court or Congress acts, Festo remains the law.'77
174. Id. at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Cf id. at 586, n.6
(characterizing Judge Newman's concern that the majority is penalizing the patent holder
by limiting evidence upon which he can rely).
175. The Supreme Court framed its argument in terms of how a change in the doctrine
of equivalents would adversely affect the USPTO without mentioning the holders of the
1.2 million currently valid patents. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 31-32 (1997). Thus, the Supreme Court appears to caution the Federal Circuit
Court against making a poor administrative decision, but the Supreme Court is really
cautioning the Federal Circuit not to legislate. Id. at 32.
To change so substantially the rules of the game now [by requiring a more rigid
rule that invokes prosecution history estoppel regardless of the reason for the
amendment] could very well subvert the various balances the [US]PTO sought to
strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which
would be affected by our decision.
Id.
176. Brown, supra note 160 (quoting Charles R. Hoffmann, a partner with Hoffmann
& Baron who represents Festo, as stating that "[tlhe Court is legislating on its own to
create a law that hasn't been fully thought out in terms of the ramifications"); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n at *10-*11, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2002 WL
1025096 (asserting that by establishing the Festo complete bar, the Federal Circuit Court
has treated its legislative mandate as a mandate to legislate).
177. Federal Circuit Court precedent regarding patent law binds Federal District
Courts. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Cf Tr. Of Oral Argument, Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2002 WL
22010, at *10 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2002) (suggesting that the USPTO might have the authority to
create a prospective rule abolishing the doctrine of equivalents).
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A. How the Supreme Court Might Correct the Federal Circuit Court's
Misinterpretation of Warner-Jenkinson
In creating a bright-line rule, the Federal Circuit Court has expanded
the meaning of "reasons relating to patentability"'78 by incorporating
formal amendments not made to avoid prior art.' On certiorari, the
Supreme Court has the opportunity to clarify its holding in Warner-
Jenkinson and to determine that "reasons related to patentability" only
refer to amendments that are required by a rejection based on
substantive, rather than formal, requirements."' The Supreme Court
could simply limit the definition of "reasons related to patentability," but
this limitation would not provide the certainty that large businesses and
their attorneys want; such a holding would simply restore a pre-Festo
landscape to the application of the doctrine of equivalents without
bringing any more certainty to this area of patent law.' In that situation,
the Federal Circuit Court's hostility toward the doctrine of equivalents
would remain, waiting to surface in a future case.'"
2
178. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33, 40 (holding that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is not available for amendments made to a claim element for a
purpose related to patentability).
179. Festo, 234 F.3d at 566 (holding that "a substantial reason related to patentability
is not limited to overcoming or avoiding prior art but instead includes any reason which
relates to the statutory requirements for a patent") (emphasis in original) (internal
quotations omitted). However, the Federal Circuit Court has drawn a similar distinction
between amendments made to avoid prior art and amendments made for completeness or
formal matters. See Petitioner's Brief at *27, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2002 WL 1025738 (citing
Black & Decker v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1294 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1989));
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 749 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v.
American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
180. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-122 (2000); see also Petitioner's
Brief at *16, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831
(2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025738 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 12 (1966) for the proposition that patentability involves the subject matter
provisions of the code only); Tr. of Oral Argument, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1.831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2002 WL 22010, at 5 (U.S. Jan
8,2002).
181. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 575 (stating that in the twenty years since Hughes Aircraft,
"the notice function of patent claims has become paramount, and the need for certainty as
to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized").
182 See id. at 593 (Plager, J., concurring) (noting that Festo presents a "second-best
solution" because it does not change the basic rule of analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents and the supposed benefits of Festo may not materialize and proposing that the
doctrine of equivalents instead be a question of equitable law) (citing Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165,1173 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see e.g., Johnson &
Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (attacking the doctrine of
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Alternatively, the Supreme Court could adopt one of the several
suggestions proposed in the various amicus briefs.'3 One potentially
workable solution, proposed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) recommends creating a "foreseeable bar''14 in cases
where no "limiting amendments" have been made during the patent
application's prosecution.' Under this scheme, the doctrine of
equivalents would apply unless the limiting effect of the language was
foreseeable at the time of the amendment."" The IEEE argues that this
interpretation follows Federal Circuit Court precedent and that its
decisions in Hughes Aircraft,"" Kinzenbawj' and Sage Products89 all
equivalents by stating that "when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject
matter," the unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public).
183. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n at *6, Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543),
available at 2001 WL 1025096 (supporting estoppel only when the surrender of the subject
matter is clear and unmistakable); Brief of the Amicus Curiae United States, at *28-*29,
*22-*23, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002)
(No. 00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025650 (arguing for a presumption in favor of the
alleged infringer that the amended claims "were narrowed by amendment, in a respect
relevant to the alleged infringement, for reasons related to patentability"). "[T]he Court
can place a comparable burden on the patent holder to demonstrate that the applicant's
narrowing amendments preserved a range of equivalents that provide a basis for asserting
infringement." Id. at *22.
184. Brief of Amicus Curiae Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs--United States of America
at *19-*20, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002)
(No. 00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025309 (stating that forseeability is an established
and well understood concept in many areas of the law: duty of care, Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); civil contract damages, Hadley v. Baxendale, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); damages in patent cases, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
185. Brief of Amicus Curiae Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs--United States of America
at *4, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No.
00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025309. The Justices, Petitioner, and Respondent
discussed this proposal at length during oral arguments. Tr. of Oral Argument, Festo
Corp. v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2002 WL
22010, at 7-11, 47 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2002). The foreseeable bar has gained some support in the
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J.,
concurring) (proposing the foreseeable bar as an alternative rationale for a finding of non-
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
186. Brief of Amicus Curiae Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs--United States of America
at *4, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No.
00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025309.
187. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
188. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he doctrine of
equivalents is designed to protect inventors from unscrupulous copyists . .. and
unanticipated equivalents.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs--United States of America at *20, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 00-1543), available at 2001 WL
1025309 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit Court's application of Graver Tank's
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support a "foreseeable bar.""' Adoption of the "foreseeable bar," or
another compromise solution, might harmonize patent law with other
areas of the law and thus ease the concern of some members of the
Federal Circuit Court.' 9' Ultimately, however, this approach offers a
temporary solution, and the same debate over the flexible and strict
approaches to the application of the doctrine of equivalents will
resurface when determining what "foreseeable" means in the patent law
context.'92
B. Given the Property Interests at Stake, Congress Is the Proper Forum to
Eliminate the Doctrine of Equivalents
Given the property rights involved, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will affirm Festo.93 However, unless the Supreme Court clearly
reverses Festo on broad grounds, there is no guarantee that the doctrine
of equivalents, as applied to unamended claims, will remain intact. This
is due in large part to the Federal Circuit Court's open hostility to the
conclusion that "the doctrine of equivalents is designed to protect inventors from
unscrupulous copyists and unanticipated equivalents" in Kinzenbaw suggests that
unforeseeable limiting effects of a claim amendment do not foreclose the use of the
doctrine of equivalents).
189. Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that
"between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did
not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to
seek protection for [a] foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure").
190. Brief of Amicus Curiae Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs--United States of America
at *21, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No.
00-1543), available at 2001 WL 1025309.
191. See id. at *19.
192. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution of the
dispute between the application of the flexible bar and absolute bar and how this led to
Festo).
193. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) ("The
doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to disavow
one of our precedents. For that doctrine not only plays an important role in orderly
adjudication; it also serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and
predictable application of legal rules. When rights have been created or modified in
reliance on established rules of law, the arguments against their change have special
force.") (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326
P.2d 484, 494-95 (Cal. 1958) (stating that to "avoid injustice," California courts should
adhere to decisions which parties have relied upon in investing money or purchasing
property "without regard to how it might be inclined to decide if the question were new");
Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 97-99
(1997) (providing support for the proposition that the law should not be applied
retroactively); see also Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. 434, 439 (1865) (stating that the
"right of property, as every other valuable right, depends in a great measure for its
security on the stability of judicial decisions").
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doctrine and the possibility that the court will attempt to weaken the
doctrine through continued narrow interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent.' 4 Such disagreement between the Federal Circuit Court and
Supreme Court would only create further uncertainty in this area of
patent law.
Given the economic, and therefore political, nature of the debate over
the doctrine of equivalents, at least one commentator has suggested that
Festo will force Congress to act.'95 In any such congressional debate,
small inventors will favor the flexible approach because it allows one
patent to cover a larger inventive area, while large corporations will
favor the Festo complete bar because they tend to file numerous
incremental improvement patents as a matter of course.'9 In the federal
judiciary, the battle between these two ideologies is pronounced, and it
would surely be played out in Congress as well.' However, despite this
contentious process, the legislature, not the Supreme Court, is the proper
venue to attempt to eliminate the doctrine of equivalents because of the
property interests that have developed in reliance on judicial doctrine.' 98
194. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 593
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002),
remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Plager, J., concurring) (lamenting that the
court did not change the basic rule of analysis under the doctrine of equivalents).
195. Scott J. Fields, Festo and Its Aftermath, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, (Mar. 29,
2001), at http://www.mondaq.com, also available at 2001 WL 8987154 ("Festo is clearly one
of the two or three most significant decisions in the history of the Federal Circuit. It
remains to be seen how the Supreme Court resolves the matter. In any event, anticipate
some Congressional action by this Summer.").
196. See supra notes 122-138 and accompanying text.
197. Compare Festo, 234 F.3d at 630 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (arguing that the majority's "announced purpose of facilitating competition by
restricting patentees' access to the doctrine of equivalents has not been evaluated for its
effect on the nation's technology-based industry"), with id. at 597 (Lourie, J., concurring)
(stating that "a majority of this court believes that important policy considerations relating
to achieving the certainty contemplated by Congress justifies departing from an older
unworkable rule").
19& See Festo, 234 F.3d at 630 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In
acting to severely limit the doctrine of equivalents, this court has made a deliberate change
in the relationship between innovator and competitor.... This spontaneous judicial action
represents a venture into industrial policy whose consequences had been inadequately
considered."); id. at 618-19 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]he
majority's rule will reduce the effective scope, and thus, the value of most of the 1,200,000
patents that are unexpired and enforceable."). See generally JOHN LOCKE, The Second
Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
Hafner Press 1947) (1690) (describing the proper role of democratic governance in a
society).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Festo does not address the Federal Circuit Court majority's
fundamental distaste for the doctrine of equivalents. Because
infringement of unamended claims under the doctrine of equivalents is
still allowed, courts must continue to choose between the flexible and
strict approaches when deciding cases. Thus, the current battle will
continue. In addition, Festo introduces inequity into the law because it
punishes patent holders who have reasonably relied on decades of
precedent, which applied the doctrine of equivalents to all claims. Festo
also introduces a host of practical problems into the administration of the
patent system.
Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse Festo and clearly state that
the doctrine of equivalents is an important tool that should be used in
patent claim interpretation. If the Court clearly endorses the flexible
approach as the method for applying the doctrine of equivalents, current
patent holders' expectations will be maintained, and congressional action
in the field will be unnecessary. If the Court simply reverses Festo on
narrow grounds, it will leave open the door for future Federal Circuit
Court attempts to limit the doctrine of equivalents, and Congress will be
forced to act in defense of intellectual property rights.
VIII. ADDENDUM
Since this article was written, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion, vacated the Federal Circuit Court's Festo decision.'9 The Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that "estoppel arises from any
amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act, not only
from amendments made to avoid prior art. ''2° In addition, the Court
vacated the Federal Circuit's holding that, for amended claims, a
complete bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents exists if
prosecution history estoppel arises. °1  The Court stated that "the
doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are
settled law, and that the responsibility for changing them rests with
Congress."2°2
199. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1843
(2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacating the judgment of the Federal
Circuit Court).
200. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1839; Festo, 234 F.3d at 566.
201. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1840. Contra Festo, 234 F.3d at 566.
202 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841 (stating that to affirm the Federal Circuit Court's
complete bar would "risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
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In affirming the Federal Circuit's holding that any reason relating to
the statutory requirements for a patent gives rise to estoppel, the Court
stated that the reason for making the amendment is unimportant;2 3 if an
amendment narrows the scope of the patent, "that a narrowing
amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give
rise to an estoppel."2°4 According to the Court, amendment of a claim is
either an admission by the patentee that he could not "claim the broader
subject matter" or that he waived his right to appeal the rejection.0 5
The Court stated that the Federal Circuit's complete bar is
"inconsistent with the purpose of applying estoppel" because it does not
allow for "the examination of the subject matter surrendered by [a]
narrowing amendment."2°6  The Court explained that through
amendment, an inventor concedes what a claim does not cover. 7
However, after amendment, it still may be unclear what the claim does
cover." The Court affirmed the presumption it had articulated in
Warner-Jenkinson that "the patentee should bear the burden of showing
that [an] amendment does not surrender [a] particular amendment in
question." ' However, the Supreme Court provided examples of where
an amendment "cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a
particular equivalent. 2 '0 How the Federal Circuit Court will interpret
this decision remains to be seen.
property"); see supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text (discussing the proper role of
Congress in any potential elimination of the doctrine of equivalents).
203. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1840; Festo, 234 F.3d at 566.
204. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1839 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 1840. This approach, taken by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
below, is similar to the Federal Circuit's refusal to speculate on whether a narrowing
amendment would have been allowed in Kinzenbaw. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741
F.2d 383, 389. See generally supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing the so-
called "strict approach" to the application of the doctrine of equivalents).
206. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1840.
207. Id. at 1841.
208. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the complete bar was unreasonable because it
foreclosed a finding of equivalence in cases where the equivalents were "unforeseeable at
the time of the amendment and beyond the fair interpretation of what was surrendered" in
the amendment. Id. See generally supra notes 183-192 and accompanying text (discussing
a proposed "foreseeable bar" to replace the Festo complete bar).
209. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841-42; see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 9t5 (2001),
vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002), remanded to 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
210. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1842. According to the Court, equivalents cannot be barred if
1) the equivalent was "unforeseeable at the time of the application," 2) the equivalent was
only tangentially related to the reason for the amendment, and 3) the patentee "could not
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute." Id.
